...But it trained customers to wait for discounts, which crushed margins and diluted the brand.
April 30, 2026
April 28, 2026
JIB Franchisee Suing JIB Corporate
".....accusing the fast-food chain of a litany of problems, including cannibalizing its stores with new locations, marketing problems and royalties on delivery orders."
“Plaintiffs have suffered millions of dollars in damages and seek all remedies permitted by law.”
April 27, 2026
PJB's Latest Clown Act
Soft serve on a Filet-O-Fish - Something a 13-year-old would do
If this guy had any adult supervision he wouldn't be allowed on the internet
I Asked Grok - "should the same person be corporate ceo and also chair of the board?"
Grok says:
No, the same person should not automatically serve as both corporate CEO and chair of the board. While it's common in the U.S. (especially among larger companies), the balance of governance principles, potential risks, and empirical evidence leans toward separating the roles in most cases—particularly for mature public companies. The decision ultimately depends on the company's size, stage, culture, and specific circumstances, but separation is increasingly viewed as a stronger governance practice.
Key Arguments For and Against Combining the Roles (CEO Duality)
Arguments in favor of combining CEO and Chair roles (stewardship or "unity of command" perspective):
- Faster, more decisive leadership: One person has clear authority, reducing internal conflict, duplication of effort, or confusion over strategy. This can be especially useful in fast-moving industries, crises, or smaller/younger companies (e.g., startups or founder-led firms) where unified direction helps execution.
- Deeper knowledge and efficiency: The CEO has intimate operational insight, which helps when setting board agendas, facilitating communication between management and directors, and making informed decisions without information gaps.
- Avoids potential power struggles: A separate chair could create rivalry or slow things down. Some studies show that forced separations (due to investor pressure) can lead to negative stock reactions and weaker subsequent performance in certain contexts.
- Works well with strong boards: If independent directors and committees are robust, duality may not harm oversight much.
Arguments against combining the roles (agency theory perspective, emphasizing checks and balances):
- Conflict of interest and weakened oversight: The board's primary job is to monitor and hold management (including the CEO) accountable—hiring, firing, evaluating performance, and setting compensation. When the CEO chairs the board, they influence meeting agendas, discussions, and even their own oversight, potentially leading to entrenchment, higher pay without strong performance links, or suppressed dissent.
- Better independence and governance: A separate, independent chair can run board meetings more objectively, encourage candid input from directors, and serve as a neutral bridge to shareholders. This is seen as reducing risks seen in scandals (e.g., Boeing, WeWork).
- Focus and bandwidth: Being CEO is already a demanding full-time operational role. Adding chair duties (facilitating board dynamics, shareholder relations) can dilute effectiveness.
- Global norms and trends: In the UK, Europe (e.g., Germany often prohibits it), Canada, and Australia, separation is the standard or strongly preferred. The U.S. has been shifting slowly—S&P 500 companies with combined roles dropped from around 50-65% in earlier years to about 40-45% in recent data, with more independent chairs emerging.
Empirical research on performance is mixed and inconclusive overall. Many meta-analyses and studies find no strong, consistent link between duality and better (or worse) firm performance, risk-taking, or compensation. Outcomes often depend on context: duality may suit high-complexity, innovative, or dynamic environments, while separation benefits firms needing stronger monitoring. Forced splits sometimes correlate with poorer results, suggesting boards should choose based on firm-specific needs rather than blanket rules.
Practical Considerations and Best Practices
- Company stage matters: Duality is more defensible in early-stage, founder-led, or high-growth private/venture companies where agility trumps formal checks. For large public firms, separation (or at least a strong lead independent director as a compromise) is preferable.
- Safeguards if combined: Strong independent directors, robust committees (e.g., audit, compensation chaired by independents), regular CEO evaluations, and clear role definitions can mitigate risks.
- If separated: The chair should ideally be independent (not a recent former executive), with a defined, non-overlapping mandate focused on board leadership rather than operations.
- Trends and pressure: Institutional investors, proxy advisors, and activists increasingly push for separation as a governance "best practice." Many companies now disclose their rationale in proxies (required by SEC rules since 2010). Splits often occur during transitions, crises, or succession planning.
In short, while a talented, trustworthy leader can handle both roles effectively in the right setting, separating them generally promotes healthier accountability, reduces conflicts, and aligns better with modern expectations of good corporate governance. Boards should evaluate this thoughtfully rather than defaulting to tradition—ask: What structure best serves shareholders and long-term value here? Many successful companies thrive either way, but the default presumption should favor independence unless there's a compelling reason otherwise.
Written entirely by Grok, I just cut and paste
https://grok.com/
April 24, 2026
McDonald’s USA President Erlinger sells $100,805 in stock
While one shouldn't base too many judgments on corporate insider buying and selling, it is interesting that over the past 24 months, Eringer has been a seller in 25 of the 61 insider transactions, or 41% of all activity. He must have a heck of a retirement advisor.
Pres of USA most active seller of MCD top execs and directors
April 22, 2026
McDonald's Store Counts - End of 2025
April 17, 2026
April 15, 2026
April 13, 2026
April 11, 2026
Should PJB Be His Own Boss?
Recent events have shown that he needs adult supervision.
NLPC's explanation of their action is in a press release HERE
Please note that the above press release includes a link to their version of PJB's history. The link is just above his picture.
April 9, 2026
PJB Makes Matters Worse
After embarrassing himself and brand McDonald's with silly social media postings, a competent CEO would lie low for a while and work on long-term image repair. But not PJB. He's obsessed with being a celebrity and calls in the Wall Street Journal to expand his profile.
April 8, 2026
April 6, 2026
Maze Comments on Chick on X
April 2, 2026
McDonald's New Director
I missed this one by a month or so, but McDonald's recently added (IMHO) a celebrity director to its board, Ford CEO James Farley. I've noticed Farley on the business channels for his ease in interviews. His responses aren't canned and rehearsed directly out of Ford's PR department.
Plus, he's a real "car-guy."
Plus, he's a cousin of the late Saturday Night Live star Chris Farley. You'll see the resemblance.
He's a far more interesting person than most on the BOD.
James D. Farley Jr. elected to McDonald's board

